LORRIED INFANTRY
After being relieved in the Troarn area, the Battalion fully expected a rest of about a week’s duration. Indeed, a Battalion area had been reconnoitred in the neighbourhood of Gazelle and Le Mesnil – now a scene of peaceful habitation. But it was to Bieville we went, and there we stayed only two nights. Big things were afoot. The great American break-through from Avranches was beginning to take shape, and more infantry were needed in the vital Vire sector. So the 3rd British Infantry Division, from holding so long and so successfully the left and open flank of the bridgehead, found itself moved lock, stock and barrel by MT to the extreme right of the British 2nd Army front, to be used as a whole, by Brigades or even by Battalions, where good solid infantry was most needed. It was, in point of fact, a long time before we were destined to operate as a Division again.
Thus for a time the Battalion assumed the role of lorried infantry. From Bieville we travelled westwards along the dusty roads and tracks of Normandy to the Bocage country South of Bayeux. A couple of nights were spent in peaceful rural surroundings, and then we were off again, only to rest for another two nights in the neighbourhood of St Martin des Bescases. By this time we had received upwards of a hundred reinforcements, including two full platoons from the 7th Battalion East Yorks with their officers, Lt. D. D. Queskey and Lt. A. Hempsall. Lt. J. R. Pinchin, of the Northamptonshires, had also joined us and we had been delighted to welcome back Lt. J. R. Bush, who had landed with us and been wounded on D + 1. He returned with the first small party of our "own" men, and this beginning of what was to become a steady trickle back of those who had trained with us in the UK, and had been evacuated in the early days, we regarded as the happiest of signs.
On the 6th of August, at first light, and again in our lorries, we left our concentration area and moved Southwards towards Vire. About five kilometres East of the town a small tributary of the River Vire cut a shallow valley in the surrounding uplands and was crossed by a main road at Pont de Vaudry. This bridge was covered by a strong enemy force holding the village of Montisanger, and beyond the river the ground, rising steadily and well wooded, ran back to the arterial road leading due East from Vire – a road vital to the Germans in withdrawal and vital to the Americans for what was to be their phenomenal advance. The task allotted to 3 British Infantry Division (less 185 Brigade who were under command 11 Armoured Division) was to capture Montisanger, gain a bridgehead at Pont de Vaudry, and finally push through to cut the all important road – no mean task, as the enemy was making here his last desperate effort to stem the tide, and was using battle-hardened paratroops in ground ideal for defensive operations.
9 British Infantry Brigade debussed at a point on the Vire-Villers Bocage road, about 6 kilometres North-east of Vire and advanced to contact on foot 2 Royal Ulster Rifles led, followed by 1 Kings Own Scottish Bordereres and again 2 Lincolns in reserve – a state of affairs we had learnt mightily to distrust. By the middle of the afternoon Montisanger was reported cleared, and the Battalion was ordered to push through and force a bridgehead over the river; the bridge by this time had been blown. The Battalion plan was for the assault to be made with "C" Coy, under Maj. G. C. A. Gilbert on the left, and "B" Coy, under Maj. P. Smith on the right. When this was successful "D" Coy, commanded by Maj. H. A. N. Mander, and "A" Coy, under Capt. A. L. Munton, would pass through and exploit as far as the railway which ran parallel to the river, some two kilometres beyond.
The action began at 1630 hours, and by 1715 the two assault Coys were across the river; but hard fighting had been entailed, and casualties that could be ill afforded suffered. Moreover, the thick woods on either side of the road into which the two Companies pushed, and as the evening wore on, the failing light, together with the inevitable feeling of isolation in such circumstances, made the position an unenviable one. At 2030 hours the CO decided to put the remainder of the Battalion across and consolidate the ground won. The enemy was strongly placed especially in a sunken road astride our axis of advance, and any question of pushing on to the railway at this juncture was unthinkable. This was done, and when darkness fell the Battalion was disposed with "C" and "D" Coys to the left of the road, and "A" and "B" Coys to the right. Main Battalion HQ had remained just South of Montisanger throughout the operation, but the CO had his tactical HQ across the river.
Most of the opposition during this action was from small arms fire, but sporadic shelling, particularly directed against the road leading from Montisanger to the bridge, from which arose a huge cloud of dust every time a vehicle moved along it, caused casualties to the Battalion, which in quality , rather than in quantity, constituted a severe blow. Of the ten or twelve shells that fell in the area of Battalion HQ, two landed very close to the RAP, and in addition to other valuable members of the staff, the MO, Capt. A. W. Little, and the Padre, Capt. (Rev.) R. G. Strutt, were wounded: Capt. Little continued to treat his patients for a short time, though obviously in pain, but finally was compelled to be evacuated, and Lt. J. W. Cooper of 9 Field Ambulance came to take his place.
But the severest blow of all was the wounding of the CO, Ltcol D. R. Wilson, while on reconnaissance during the final stages of the battle. He was hit in the shoulder by a fragment of mortar bomb, and had to go. We were bitterly sorry when Ltcol. Welby-Everard was taken away, but the blow was somewhat softened by the knowledge that his successor was a man of unbounding energy, perennial cheerfulness and eminently sound judgement. Called to command a Battalion that in two days had lost a high percentage of its very best in officers, NCOs and men alike, he had set about the task of reorganising and rebinding with such exhaustless enthusiasm that he had managed to impart, in his own inimitable fashion, much of his own superabundant confidence to officers called upon at very short notice to assume heavy responsibilities, and under his leadership the depleted Battalion had fought this action as worthily as any before it.
Major L. H. B. Colvin now assumed command and hurried forward to take stock of the situation. Consolidation by the companies was complete, and at midnight Maj. Colvin called forward his Battalion HQ. Thus it was that the Battalion spent the night of 6/7 Aug. alone, as it were, in enemy territory, deploring the loss of a second CO, but resolute and determined. Higher command warned us to be ready for a heavy counter-attack, and ready we were. Ground so hardly won would not be surrendered lightly.
Lt. A. Hempsall, leading his platoon in "B" Coy’s assault across the river, was killed by machine gun fire. He had only been with us for six days, and this was his first action. We had taken to him because of his cheerfulness and his eagerness for action; that night we honoured him for what he had done, and for the tributes paid to him by the men of his platoon. He had dies with his face to the enemy, and words of encouragement on his lips.
Five other ranks gave their lives also in this battle, and Lt. E. W. Mudge of "C" Coy and 38 other ranks were wounded.
At 0730 hours the following morning Maj. Colvin was called to Brigade HQ for orders, and within the hour returned, bringing with him our new CO, Ltcol. C. L. Firbank of the Somerset Light Infantry, who had been GSO I (L) at Divisional HQ. And together they brought the strange news that the expected heavy counter attack was no longer expected – how a situation could change so drastically overnight remains a mystery – and the advance was to continue. Indeed, the zero hour appointed by Brigade was fast approaching, and the new CO summoned his Coy Commanders to give them their orders.
It was a strange – almost historic – meeting that took place in a filthy old stone farmhouse that morning of August 7th. Weary and unshaven Coy Commanders, the 2IC, and the Adjutant, our Battery Commander, that very excellent gunner and friend of the Battalion, Maj. A. B. Edwards, RA. Somewhat timid in the presence of this stranger, and Col Firbank himself, just a little bewildered at his sudden translation in the very middle of a battle, not very happy at having to ask of us what he had to ask, but at the same time giving off his orders clearly and firmly. How could re realise then that most of us were destined to remain together for many months, to travel together many hundreds of miles, through four countries, and that under his inspiring leadership, the Battalion would renew its vigour, regain its character and fighting power, touch the very heights of glory, and earn for itself a name second to none in this struggle to the death?
This time the railway was the first objective, to be made good by "D" Coy on the left and "A" Coy on the right. "C" and "B" Coys would follow through and exploit as far forward as possible. The main road running East from Vire was still the final aim, and at the moment there was no suggestion that any other troops would be employed other than 2 Lincolns. As far as we knew there was nobody on either flank, and it was with some trepidation that the word was given to advance. It is not easy to switch the mind on outside orders from determination to defend to the death to confident advance to attack.
A concentration of enemy shells on "A" Coy HQ delayed the start slightly, but soon the advance was under way, and satisfactory progress was reported. "D" Coy were held up for a while by enemy holding the sunken road, but on the other side of the road "A" Coy pushed steadily on. It was only when they had deployed the whole company in the open cornfields between the wood and the railway that the enemy’s diabolical plan unfolded itself. Entrenched on the rising ground beyond the railway – in no great strength but well endowed with automatic weapons, and having full observation whilst almost impossible to locate himself – he waited for the Coy to leave the cover of the wood and then opened up from every direction. "A" Coy found themselves in parlous straits: the slightest movement brought immediate fire, and so naked were they, it was impossible to get their guns in position to return the fire with any effect. Of their three officers, two were wounded in the early stages. It became increasingly evident that they could only advance at disastrous cost and finally, under cover of smoke, they were withdrawn.
Meanwhile on the other side of the road, "D" Coy were encountering difficulties of their own. The country was closer here and there were several buildings. Under cover of these one platoon reached the railway, and actually got a section across. But immediately the way was barred for at the same time the rest of the Company came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from the left flank. It was an impossible situation. Pte. L. Allison, a platoon runner, showed extreme courage and devotion to duty by crossing the railway twice under fire to take a message to the isolated section, and was later awarded the Military Medal. But no amount of bravery could have rendered such an operation successful, and this Company too was ordered to withdraw. It was hoped that the section which had crossed the railway would be able to get back under cover of darkness, but they were looked for in vain.
This was fortunately the last time – at least for many months - that we were asked to push our necks out to see if the enemy had lost his chopper, and as luck would have it we got off reasonably lightly. There was one black moment in the late afternoon when we thought we might have to write off practically two whole companies, but when we had settled back again in our tight circle and called the roll, we discovered that we had lost only 3 other ranks killed and Capt. A. L. Munton, Lt. R. H. Mercer, `Lt. E. G. Webb and 19 other ranks wounded. 9 other ranks were reported missing.
One of the fatal casualties was Pte. J. Bacon of "A" Coy, who had been mentioned in despatches during the 1940 campaign. He was killed while moving across with his water bottle to give a drink to a wounded comrade.
Capt. Munton rejoined the following day, having recovered from the temporary blindness caused by the blast from an enemy shell.
The Battalion remained for three further days in the Pont de Vaudry position, and on the evening of August 10th was relieved by 1 East Yorks. The following day the whole Brigade group moved by march route, without incident, to a position along the high ground immediately East of Vire and the Battalion was disposed almost in the suburbs of the town. We were now on the extreme right of the Second Army front and made our first real contact with the Americans.
Here we maintained contact with the enemy by patrols, and on two occasions managed to hit him very hard. On one of these a patrol, led by Lt. J. R. Bush, stalked an enemy strongpoint in an orchard just South-east of Vire during daylight, with the object of bringing down on the position the maximum amount of fire power possible and then withdrawing. A troop of tanks and a sec of carriers assisted, their fire being directed from another angle. Lt. Bush led the patrol with consummate skill and in the middle of the fire fight was hit by machine gun fire, which broke his right arm. He continued however to direct the fire of his patrol and refused to withdraw until his object had been attained. There is no doubt that heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy, and that the action materially affected the success of later operations by 8 British Infantry Brigade. We were sorry to have to say Au Revoir to Lt. Bush a second time in this campaign; he had fulfilled all the promise of his home training and proved himself a fearless leader and able tactician. We were gratified to learn later that for this action he was awarded the Military Cross.
Sjt. J. Wilcock, Carrier Platoon Serjeant, an old member of the Battalion and an excellent NCO, received wounds during this patrol from which he later unfortunately died.
Four days were spent near Vire, and on 6th August the Battalion moved East by march route to take over ground won by the Guards Armoured Brigade just South of Viessoix. Here little of incident occurred, except that we hailed with delight the return from England of Maj. S. J. Larking and Capt. P. H. W. Clarke. The former took over command of his old Company, "A" Coy, and the latter went to command "D" Coy. ON August 18th we took to our lorries again ad moved through Vire to Tinchebray and on to Landisacq, midway between Tinchebray and Flers.