The capture of Caen was regarded by the Higher Command merely as a stepping stone to greater things. The open country beyond leading southwards to Falaise and rolling eastwards to the Seine was the real objective. There the enemy might be tempted to do battle on a large scale and our overwhelming armoured superiority be exploited.

The Battalion was therefore only allowed five days o rest and reorganisation and on the 16^th of July, with the remainder of the Divisional group, it moved East of the river Orne and concentrated in the area of Amfreville.

At the same time the C-in-C moved the bulk of his armour also across the river, and his plan was to break through the German defences East of Caen after an aerial bombardment on an unprecedented scale. The objectives were – on the right Falaise and on the left Argences.

This time the whole of 3 British Infantry Division had a flanking protection role. The task allotted was to move down the left flank of the main thrust and secure the town of Troarn, 8 British Infantry Brigade were to move first, following closely on the bombing, through Escoville and Touffreville to Sannerville and Bannerville La Campagne which straddled the main road from Caen to Troarn. 9 British Infantry Brigade were to follow through to Sannerville, swing eastwards and capture Troarn itself. The Brigade plan was for 1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers to move first, followed by 2 Royal Ulster Rifles, with 2 Lincolns in reserve.

The 19^th of July was the day chosen for the operation and it dawned bright and clear, ideal in every way for the demonstration of aerial might, upon which the success of the initial break through largely hinged. Soon after dawn we heard the planes coming over, punctual to the minute, to give us our second experience of the awe-inspiring spectacle of concentrated bombing on a gigantic scale. First the heavies, with the task of blasting the strongly defended villages on either side of the Sannerville plain, with their 4,000 lb bombs; then the mediums with fragmentation bombs to destroy the German defenders without impeding the passage forward of massed British armour.

It was a noisy prelude to a noisy battle; no sooner had the last bomb fallen than concentrated artillery took up the destructive work while the rumble of tanks and half tracks away on our right told us that the battle was really "on". In this crescendo of unearthly din, we waited, wondering and tense for the order to advance, forgetting, in our excitement, even the mosquitoes which, coming up from the swamps of the Dives valley, had made lift miserable for the last two days.

Soon came news of quick successes – Cuverville – Giberville – Demouvile – Touffreville – Sannerville – all were entered in quick succession, and when finally just after midday we moved forward, elation was the dominant emotion. At last the enemy, who had so stubbornly defended the north-western approaches to Caen, was on the run, and eager British troops at his heels. We even felt a little rueful that we, who had faced the best the Hun could put against us at such close quarters, and for so long, in Cambes and Le Mesnil, should have so limited a role in this decisive battle.

But we were soon to discover that we had made again the most popular of all mistakes: in the flush of immediate success we had underrated the enemy, forgotten his discipline and staying power, his fighting qualities and proneness to hit back. In the days that followed, the lessons we had been taught in the early days of the campaign and should have been slow to forget we were to learn again in blood and toil and sweat.

Across the plain the enemy fell back, it is true; who would not, in the face of such a heavily supported attack? But he only fell back to a strongly prepared line, and our armour seeking battle with the German Mark IVs after a Libyan pattern found the way barred by an impenetrable screen of powerful antitank guns. And soon it was plain he had no intention of giving ground in the wooded country round Troarn, where he had been untouched by the bombing and could not be reached by the tanks. He had lost the hinge of his defences at Caen. Troarn was to be held to the last possible moment as the next best thing.

9 British Infantry Brigade attack on Troarn started at about 1530 hours from the village of Sannerville, with 1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers on the right and 2 Royal Ulster Rifles on the left. 2 Lincolns moved up to the plain to the west of the village and remained in reserve. 2 Royal Ulster Rifles soon made good the brickworks, about 1,500 yards north-west of the town, but when they reached the main road running south-east from Escoville they encountered strong opposition and could make no further progress. 1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers, advancing along the axis of the railway, were also held up about the same distance from Troarn, and in spite of the determination of the Corps Commander that the town should be taken that night and his strange belief that the enemy was completely disorganised, the attack petered out. 2 Lincolns moved down into the devastated area of Sannerville, encountering heavy shell fire on the way, and the Brigade dug in for the night.

Orders for the 19^th July were based on the resolve that Troarn must fall. The other two Battalions of the Brigade were to feel their way forward and gradually gather momentum for the final assault on the town. We were to create a diversion by demonstrating southwards towards the main Caen – Troarn road, just East of Sannerville. It was in carrying out this operation that the Battalion became acquainted with a small patch of orchard country which will never be forgotten by those who were fortunate enough to survive. In two days in that spot the Battalion was destined to lose 18 other ranks killed, 10 officers (including the Commanding Officer) and 182 other ranks wounded. It was "Black Orchard" indeed.

The demonstration, timed to coincide with the continued advance of 1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers and 2 Royal Ulster Rifles, began about 1100 hours. The whole operation was destined to make but scanty progress. The enemy had concentrated his guns, including a number of Nebelwerfers, in an area South-east of Troarn, and cunningly sited his machine gun posts covering every approach to the town. It quickly became evident that an attack in such close country, virtually unsupported – for our own guns were scarcely in a position to fire even if targets had been located by this time – against what was evidently a carefully co-ordinated system of defensive fire, would be doomed to costly failure. The major attack, in fact, made practically no headway – certainly never came near to threatening Troarn itself, while the Battalion, entering the orchards between the railway and the road encountered, while still advancing, successive concentrations of heavy shell and mortar fire. It hung on grimly and dug as it had never dug before, but when eventually it was ordered to withdraw across the railway to its former positions and stand to to beat off an expected counter-attack, it was the weaker by three officers and 86 other ranks, eight of the latter having been killed.

It was a bitter blow to the Battalion to have the CO, Ltcol. C. E. Welby-Everard, wounded at this time. He was hit by fragments of a mortar bomb, as he took shelter in a trench which received almost a direct hit. It was typical of him that as he was taken away his thoughts were for the Battalion far more than for himself, and that at the very first opportunity back in England he should write to the Adjutant to clear up some small detail connected with the PRI account that might be causing a little bother. He took over command of the Battalion on March 10^th, which gave him but little time to prepare for the tremendous task that lay ahead. But such was his untiring zeal and ready insight, his persistent attention to detail and his amazing memory – the product of a well-disciplined mind – that in the three short months he was given for preparation, he had fully assumed assured control, and he brought over to France a Battalion in which every man had the utmost confidence in his leadership. In action he was unruffled and unhurried, self-assured in the truest aspect of the phrase, at the same time an inspiration and a steadying influence to officers and men alike. Steeped in the finest Regimental traditions, and always aware of a very real pride in his command, he must surely have come near to being the ideal Commanding Officer.

Maj. D. R. Wilson, who had rejoined the Battalion, to everybody’s complete satisfaction, on February 21^st, and had been his very right hand in the final organisation, and to whom assault scales and vehicle loads, that might baffle the brain of any Senior Wrangler, were mere child’s play, assumed command. At such a time and in such circumstances, the Battalion could not have been in better hands.

The following day, July 20^th, the expected counter-attack having failed to materialise, the Battalion again received the order to advance and occupy the ground from which it had been ordered to withdraw the previous night – and there followed the second bloody scene in the grim drama of "Black Orchard". Heavy-eyed through lack of sleep, soaked to the skin by a series of thunder showers, and plastered with the greasy Normandy clay, the companies edged their way forward and found themselves again unprotected in the defensive fire belt of the German artillery and mortars. From about 1830 hours until about 2230 hours the Battalion dug in under what seemed like an endless concentration, and when things became quieter, and some assessment of casualties could be made, it was discovered that ten other ranks had been killed, and seven officers and one hundred and four other ranks evacuated.

Thus in two days the Battalion had lost ten officers – the CO, Maj. R. S. Hunter, commanding "D" Coy, Maj. B. J. M. Burghes, Commanding "A" Coy, who had joined us as a reinforcement in the Cambes days, the Adjutant, Capt. W. R. Chambers, Capt. J. Boys, 2IC of "B" Coy, Capt. D. J. Kidney, OC Carrier Platoon, Capt. W. W. B. Berrie, another reinforcement, Lt. E. S. Thornhill, Lt. A. F. Henry and Lt. J. A. Walker – and exactly 200 other ranks.

Lt. J. Bucknall, who was the Battalion Liaison Officer at Brigade HQ, and had carried out his difficult and often dangerous job with constant cheerfulness and efficiency, was also wounded at the same time as the Commanding Officer.

It is invidious to single out for special mention officers or men who showed in these two trying days especial fortitude and bore themselves according to the finest traditions of the British Army and the Regiment to which they belonged. No doubt many a heroic deed passed unnoticed against a general background of heroism. Carriers afire were driven to places where they could do least harm, and ammunition was offloaded at great personal risk. All who had vehicles and could drive were assisting in evacuating the wounded to the RAP, and the MO and his staff working inside the Battalion area completely in the open – and overworked at that – assisted by the Padre and the Provost Sjt and his men, showed a coolness an d an efficiency which in such circumstances can scarcely have been surpassed. For their devotion to duty, and complete disregard for their own comfort or safety on this and other occasions, Lcpl. Hewson and Lcpl. Dyson, two stretcher bearers, were awarded the Military Medal.

On the morning of 21 July, Capt. J. Harrod, who had left the Battalion on the evening of D day to become Brigade Intelligence Officer, rejoined to take over the duties of Adjutant. He found the Battalion nineteen officers and nearly four hundred other ranks below strength.

On July 22^nd the Battalion was relieved in the area of "Black Orchard" by the 1^st South Lancashires, and moved to Escoville to reorganise. During the two and a half days it spent there, about sixty reinforcements were received, including Capt. R. L Griffiths and Capt. W. J. Parsons of the South Wales Borderers, who took over command of the Anti-tank and Mortar Platoons respectively. The Mortar Platoon had suffered badly and was at this time completely non-effective, not a single senior NCO remaining.

On the morning of July 25^th the Battalion returned to the line, relieving the 2^nd Battalion East Yorks in the brickworks area of North-west of Troarn where it spent a comparatively uneventful week. Contact was made by patrols to the east, and the Battalion area occasionally received attention from enemy artillery and mortars, but we were well dug in and suffered little. Total casualties for the period were two killed and 25 wounded.