BATTLE OF HEROUVILLETE

The plan for 3 British Division’s part in the Capture of Caen, was for 185 Brigade to take LeBisey and its wood and the high ground beyond overlooking Caen itself, and for 9 Brigade to pass through into the town, 8 Brigade were to remain in reserve.

It was necessary, however, for 185 Brigade to have protection on their left and open flank, and for that purpose 2 Lincolns were placed under their command, and given the task of moving up in a line with the leading battalions, with their own left flank on the riverk to capture the village of Herouvillette (or Herouville) and exploit beyond.

The CO received his orders from Commander 185 Brigade on the morning of 7 July, and the attack was fixed for the next day. The afternoon was spent by Company Commanders in reconnaissance, the 2IC, Maj. D. R. Wilson, taking them forward for this purpose to the southern edge of the grounds of the chateau at Beauregard, from where a good view of the ground could be obtained. This was also to be the Battalion forming up place, and at last light on the 7th "D" Coy, under Maj. R. S. Hunter, moved into position there to protect the start line. Some old German trenches provided excellent ready-made positions for this task. At the time a carrier and mortar group, under the command of Capt. D. J. Kidney, occupied the high ground on the right of the chateau to protect the Battalion right flank as it moved forward.

The Battalion plan was for "B" Coy, under Maj. L. H. B. Colvin, to clear the village of Herouvillette, and for "A" Coy, under Maj. R. J. Burghes, and "C" Coy, under Maj. G. C. A. Gilbert, to pass through and exploit along the river bank as far as the junction of the Canal de Caen and the river Orne.

It was generally thought that the key to the capture of Caen was the capture of LeBisey wood and the ring contour 60 beyond it. To a large extent this was true, for that dominating feature had been a thorn in the flesh of 185 Brigade ever since D day when they first came into contact with it. But a terrific air bombardment on the Northern outskirts of Caen, on the evening of the 7th, witnessed with awe by the Battalion in Blainville – and a tremendous artillery concentration on LeBisey itself (including the 16 inch guns of HMS Rodney), followed by a determined assault by 2 Royal Warwicks and 2 Kings Shropshire Light Infantry, brought about its fall with comparative ease, and before midday 1 Royal Norfolk, closely followed by 1 Kings Own Scottish Borderers and 2 Royal Ulster Rifles from our own Brigade group were on the move to exploit success.

But it was on the left flank, in the narrow strip of ground between the river and the rising ground, that the bloodiest fighting was taking place. Here the Battalion, practically unsupported, and scarcely remembered in the flush of victory elsewhere, was meeting stiff opposition and stubborn resistance. The task of looking after the flank, while the major assault rolled on to its objective, a comparatively simple one in prospect, was proving the hardest engagement of the day. Fierce fighting at close quarters took place – "B" Company Commander, Maj. L. H. B. Colvin, at the head of his Company, himself shot with a rifle two Germans at point blank range, and it was some time before the village could be reported clear of enemy, and "A" and "C" Coys ordered forward.

It should be remembered that the whole of this operation was carried out under the enemy’s observation. Not only did he occupy the high ground East of the river, but the factory at Colombelles, with its tall chimneys, still stood, and had been recognised since D day as one of his main observation posts. It is, therefore, not to be surprised at that when the enemy had finally given up Herouvillette it should be subjected to heavy fire from enemy mortars and guns on the other side of the river. This fact added considerably to the Battalion’s list of casualties.

Twice during the day the enemy attempted to regain lost ground, by counter-attack, on each occasion using tanks. It was during one of these that Pte. J. Thompson of "C" Coy distinguished himself with the P.I.A.T. A force of enemy about two platoons strong, supported by three Mark IV tanks, attacked his company position. Pte. Thompson immediately engaged the leading tank with his weapon and knocked it out. The second one, damaged by a further shot, turned away, the third followed suit and the attack petered out.

It is difficult to describe in detail the remainder of the action. There was nothing of the spectacular about it: the Battalion just pushed the Germans back, moving forward bit by bit according to plan. By the morning of the 9th July "A" Coy had reached the river beyond Herouvillette, and during the afternoon the Battalion consolidated in that area, commanding the Colombelles bridge with patrols forward to the outskirts of Caen, and between the river and the canal.

The operation cost the Battalion dear. Capt. J. C. Roll, OC Mortar Platoon, and Lt. Richardson, a "Canloan" officer, together with 30 other ranks, were killed. It was with deep regret that we learnt that Capt. Roll had been killed – as fate would have it, by a mortar bomb. He had been with the Battalion for over three years, and his cheerfulness was a tonic to everybody, as his enthusiasm was an example. By his death the Battalion lost a fine officer and a fine man.

Lt. Richardson we had unfortunately scarcely got to know, but he brought with him the ardent spirit of the dominion soldier and dies the soldiers death, leading his platoon into the attack.

Lt. H. R. Logsdail, a platoon commander of "D" Copy, died of wounds received in this battle. An officer of the regiment for some considerable time, but fairly new to the Battalion, he was one of a quiet and unassuming disposition. But there was nothing unassuming in his leadership of his platoon in action against the enemy, and his men followed him with confidence. We had hoped that his wounds would not prove fatal, and that we should see him with us again. A Battalion can ill spare such gifted leaders.

Six officers and one hundred and thirty two other ranks were wounded. The Officers were Capt. J. N. Ebbutt, 2IC "C" Coy, Capt. P. G. Cliff, OC Anti-tank Platoon, Lt. G. R Canner (actually on patrol on the night of 6/7), Lt. P. N. Bowskill, Cap[t. J. R. Pawlett, 2IC Carrier Platoon, and Lt. Barnes, another "Canloan" officer who joined us at the same time as Lt. Richardson.

The Battalion was denied the privilege of entering Caen. Other battalions had that task and naturally enough the spotlight was on them, for Caen was a prize indeed. But when all the details leading to its capture are considered on their merits, the action of 2 Lincolns on 8 and 9 July will rank high in the contributory factors. Who can tell what the delay might have been had not considerable forces of the enemy been contained – and more than contained – by the Battalion on these two memorable days?

On the morning of 10 July the Battalion was relieved by 3 Recce Regt., and together with the rest of the Brigade, went back for a rest. The area allotted was at Lion-sur-Mer, less than half a mile from the beach it landed on five weeks before, and by a strange coincidence, Battalion HQ was set up in exactly the same spot as it had been in such different circumstances on the previous occasion.

Five weeks in constant contact in such conditions was no mean record of service, and on the night of the 10 July the Battalion removed its boots and slept, conscious of a great task nobly performed.

Some months elapsed before any awards in connection with this action were announced, but when they were it was gratifying to find that the work of the Battalion had not passed unrecognised. Maj. L. H. B. Colvin received the MC. Sjt. T. Rippin "B" Coy, the DCM, and the following were awarded the MM; Lsjt T. Pretty, "A" Coy, and Cpl. A. Daubney, "A" Coy.

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