The Battalion was given little time to rehabilitate itself to battle conditions before it was called upon to carry out that most difficult of all operations of war – the assault crossing of a water obstacle.
On arrival in the concentration area, about 4 kilometres South of the Escaut Canal, in the later afternoon of 16 September, the Battalion dug in among the woods surrounding an open space of ground in which was a small farmstead occupied by Battalion HQ. Scarcely an hour after our arrival we were ordered to send a Company to occupy the village of Caulille, about 2 kilometres to the East, and "A" Coy were allotted this task.
The Canal at this point ran approximately East to West and was crossed by the main road at the village of Lille St Hubert. The bridge over the canal of course had been demolished. About a kilometre and a half to the North of the Canal the road swung Eastwards towards the small town of Hamont and the Dutch-Belgian frontier beyond. The job 3 British Infantry Division was called upon to do was to force a crossing of the canal and make good the main road, thus enabling the Engineers to bridge the obstacle and 11 Armoured Division to surge forward into Holland. The operation was entrusted to 9 British Infantry Brigade.
When the Brigade debussed after its 300 kilometre clash from the banks of the Seine, it found elements of 3 Recce Regiment in Lille St Hubert, and 1 King’s Own Scottish Borderers went forward to relieve them. The remainder of the Brigade Group concentrated astride the main road with 2 Royal Ulster Rifles on the left and 2 Lincolns, as already stated, in the wooded area on the right.
It was originally intended that the crossing should be made on the night of 19/20 September, and the Battalion planned to spend the interim period – short enough in all conscience – in brushing up its handling of assault boats. However, at midday on the 18th we heard that the operation might be carried out that night, and by 1630 hours this was confirmed, the CO returning from Brigade HQ to give out his orders.
The Brigade plan was for 2 Royal Ulster Rifles to cross on the left of the original bridge and 2 Lincolns on the right, and 2 Lincolns on the right, and upon success 1 Judge’s Own Scottish Borderers would pass through and extend the limits of the bridgehead to include the main road. Zero hour was to be midnight and from 0030 hours operations were to be assisted by that novel ‘weapon’ of was – artificial moonlight provided by a section of searchlights.
The CO chose as his assault Companies, "D" Coy, under Maj. P.H.Wl Clarke, on the left, and "C" Coy, under Maj. G.C.A. Gilbert, on the right, "A" Coy, commanded by Maj. S.J. Larkin were to follow "C" Coy and when across, to fan out to protect the right flank. "B" Coy, under Maj. P.Smith, was held in reserve. The Battalion transport, carefully arranged in order of priority for crossing, was concentrated in the rear Battalion area under Capt. R.L. Griffiths, and the OC HQ Coy. Capt. A.F. Curnow was to organise its passage forward at the appropriate moment. The Pioneer Platoon, under the Lt. T. Pogson, were to build two class 5 rafts, with which to ferry the transport from across the Canal.
It was fortunate indeed, in view of the bringing forward of the operation by 24 hours, that the Co and the Coy Commanders had carried out a reconnaissance of the Canal during the morning and afternoon and were fully aware of the difficulties attached to the task allotted them. Like all Canals in this part of the world, the Escaut was contained in banks which rose steeply to a height of some 10 feet above the surrounding country, while over the bank a concrete waterway for the manipulation of the cumbersome assault boats could scarcely have been found.
At 2000 hours the Battalion moved forward through the woods, and reached its forward assembly area, and by 2345 hours, assisted by carrying parties from 1 King’s Own Scottish Borderers, the assaulting companies had formed up and were ready to go. At five minutes before midnight the Divisional artillery fired concentrations on the enemy positions on the far bank and enemy mortars replied. Punctually at zero hour the first boats hit the water and in spite of heavy gun fire from the small arms, and a 20mm gun which was firing directly down the Canal from the right, by 0015 hours the two Companies reported themselves over.
At this juncture the Canal presented an amazing spectacle. Just before retiring the enemy had set fire to a house on "D" Coys front, and the flames, fanned by the wind, leapt skywards and illuminate the whole crossing area. Boats were moving steadily backwards and forwards, the Pioneer Platoon were already busy about their raft building, and Signallers were rushing up cable to establish early communication with Battalion HQ, which was situated about half a kilometre behind the Canal.
By 0215 all the Rifle Coys were across and digging in. "B", "C" and "D" Coys with forward Battalion HQ consolidated the tiny village of Broek, while "A" Coy, who in difficult wooded and marshy country to the right were still in close contract with the enemy, carried out faithfully their protective role.
By this time too, in spite of intermittent mortar fire, the Pioneers had completed their task and the essential Battalion transport – carriers, jeeps and anti-tank guns and a forward RAP - was being dealt with in a steady flow. It was a job well done, and Lt. Pogson had a great cause for pride in the achievement of his platoon, for when first light arrived and the class 12 bridge built by the Sappers was complete, it was not necessary for us to burden it with traffic. All we required was across and we had put it across ourselves.
The following day was one of marked contrast within the Brigade and Battalion area. Over on the left 2 Royal Ulster Rifles had successfully consolidated their bridgehead and 1 King’s Own Scottish Borderers were passing through astride the main road towards the village of Achel. Though progress was slow, it was steady and opposition relatively light. In Broek too, where the Battalion was largely situated, there was little to report in the way of enemy interference. But over in "A" Coy area a bitter battle was being fought. A party of Germans, consisting we later discovered largely of Officer cadets in the line to gain battle experience, tough and fanatical in their resistance, was determined to prevent further forward movement. It was a trying day for the Company: everything was in favour of the defender, but gradually the enemy was worn down, and when in the late afternoon the 2nd East Yorks passed through, the effect of "A" Coys efforts was seen. Stiffly resisting at first, the Hun gradually broke, and, by morning, he had had enough and gone.
At 1700 hours on 20 September the Battalion moved forward and disposed itself in and around a large monastery, just East of Achel. When the monks had decided they would be friendly after all, they told us their building had been used as a German HQ and that our operation of the night 18/19 had caused first anger and finally consternation among the staff. One high ranking officer, on being informed that British troops were on his side of the Canal, had called for his car, and vanished into the night!
There can be no doubt that the Battalion acquitted itself well in this short but difficult operation. The plan was shrewdly thought out, to the extent that every department of the Battalion had its carefully allotted task in the general scheme, and it was well and faithfully executed. Success depended upon everybody just doing his job – and that is exactly what happened. There was a cohesion about the operation which made it like the unfolding of a tense and stirring drama.
It should be said that from the moment the assault began, communications were excellent. The Signal Platoon under Lt. P. Robinson rose nobly to the occasion. So much depended upon them to minimise the effect of the physical barrier, and they did not fail. From beginning to end they were ‘strength five’, loud and clear!
Such an operation could not, of course, be carried out without loss. The assault Companies suffered heavily, and on the right Maj. Gilbert, in less than 15 minutes, found himself bereft of all his Officers. Capt. G. G. E. Bennett, his second in command, who had joined us at Vatimesnil after being Brigade Transport Office for two years, was hit in the face by small arms fire. Lt. P. M. London, one of the Platoon Commanders of "C" Coy, was killed and Lt. D. D. Queskey, another, received wounds from which he later died. They were two fine young officers: both coming to us from other regiments, they had taken their place quietly but efficiently in the Battalion scheme of things, and by the time they came to give their lives, they were our old friends.
Maj. P. H. W. Clarke, leading his Coy over the Canal, exploded a mine and received a nasty wound in the face, which broke off two of his front teeth; fortunately, though seriously inconvenienced, he managed to carry on. Lt. T. Gration, commanding a platoon of "D" Coy, was also wounded. 59 other ranks were wounded during the operation.
The gallantry of many members of the Battalion during the operation did not pass unrecognised. Maj. G. C. A. Gilbert and Maj. P. H. W. Clarke, Commanders of the assault Companies, were awarded the MC, as was Lt. T. Pogson for his magnificent work in building his rafts under constant mortar fire. The Military Medal was given to Sjt. L. Waters, who commanded a platoon of "D" Coy, to Pte. H. Everett "A Coy runner, who twice crossed the canal under fire to deliver messages, and to Pte. L. Woolley of "C" Coy who assumed command of a disorganised and leaderless section and took it through to its objective.
On September 21st the Battalion moved to the small town of Hamont, about 9 kilometres East of Achel. 11 Armoured Division were already across the Dutch border and fighting a stiff battle for a bridgehead over the Canal at Asten. But the right flank of this thrust was not fully secured and at Hamont the Battalion would be well situated to move to counter any threat. In point of fact, in spite of a series of alarms, we saw no fighting here at all.
It was a pleasant little town and the inhabitants were markedly friendly. Here we first encountered an eager band of the armed ‘underground’, the vigour of whose enthusiasm was only matched by the inaccuracy of their information. Here, too, we first realised the unostentatious bravery of their people, many of whom, during the long years of occupation, had given shelter and food to Allied airmen brought down over their country and organised an intricate system for their escape.
Still in the wake of 11 Armoured Division, we left Hamont on the 26th September and crossed the border to take over from 3 Monmouths in the Dutch town of Deurne. Following the dropping of large forces of airborne troops astride the upper and lower Rhine, the Nimegen salient was taking shape and the protection of the attenuated supply lines became a major consideration. Though we probed continually at the German line of defences along the Deurne Canal, and even made two attempts to cajole him into surrender with the aid of a radio-diffusion van, this was really our role, and after we had spent four days in Deurne and two in an area between Bakel and Milheese, 3 British Infantry Division collected its component parts and moved to straddle the river Maas East of Nimegen, with two Brigades across the river, and our own on the South and West of it. The Battalion found itself after this latest move with two Companies in the small village of Oeffelt, a kilometre or so West of the river, and the remainder in the area of Haps.
Here we stayed until the 12th of October, and no major incident occurred to mar a very pleasant sojourn among friendly people. The Coys that occupied Oeffelt – and each was there in turn – played hide and seek with German patrols which somehow, in spite of constant vigilance, managed to cross the river from Gennep. And our friends of 33 Field Regiment RA, finding themselves for the first time with Ops which were really a gunner’s dream, harassed with consistent delight enemy troops and transport using the roads on the far side of the Maas.