Occupation of Louvain, 12th to 16th May
Early on Sunday, 12th May, the 9th Brigade moved up to occupy the position in conjunction with the Belgians, and the position was therefore held by a mixed force. The Brigade dispositions were 2nd Lincolnshire on the right in the southern outskirts of the town, 2nd R.U.R. in the centre, and lst K.O.S.B. on the left. The Battalion frontage was about 3,500 yards, and an extensive area of flooding supposed to exist south of the town was found to be non-existent as the sluices had not yet been blown. In addition to this very wide frontage there was a gap of at least a mile between the right flank of the Battalion and the nearest unit of lst Corps on the right, and several officers' patrols had to be sent out before this unit could be located. Most of the bridges had already been prepared for demolition; others were made ready by 253 Field Company, R.E., and most of them were blown up before contact with the enemy was gained. Some had to be left intact to allow the withdrawal of the 12th Lancers, whose patrols were some twelve miles out in front, and of the 15th/19th Hussars, the 3rdDivisional Cavalry Regiment, and also the 13th/18th Hussars of the lst Division on the right.
The Belgians had put out considerable wire obstacles, but apart from some pill-boxes, which were well sited and well disguised, there were no other defences. Slit trenches were dug, and where this was not possible, houses were used and put into a state of defence. This latter caused some difficulty as in many cases civilians were still in residence. At nights, lights were numerous and, after contact had been gained, there is little doubt that many of these were used for signalling to the enemy. In "A" Company's sector on the right, the proprietor of a roadhouse was found to have a transmitting set in his house and a Morse key that worked on the neon light sign on the roof. When challenged, he tried to escape, but was caught and was subsequently shot.
A systematic search of the Battalion area produced no fewer than five wireless transmitting sets, but unfortunately the owners had in each case departed. About this time, Major Preston, who had returned to cvrnmand "B" Company just before the advance into Belgium, again left the Battalion to take up the duties of Brigade Major. Captain Goulson took over command of "B" Company and Second-Lieutenant Chamberlain became Intelligence Officer.
On 13th May, contact was gained fairly early by the 12th Lancers, but the enemy seemed disinclined to push on. Later in the day, however, the cavalry were withdrawn, the remaining bridges blown and infantry patrols sent out instead. It was in fact on this day that the Belgian Army to the north had had to fall back upon Huy, on the River Meuse, and at Maestricht had been unable to demolish important bridges over the Meuse and the Albert Canal; at the same time a German thrust in the south with at least two Panzer divisions was developing on the front of the French Ninth Army in the Ardennes area, opposite Luxembourg.
Early on the 14th, contact was made with the enemy all along the front. Shelling and mortar fire started, but mostly on Louvain itself, although the cemetery on "D" Company's front came in for a great deal of attention. This was a very gruesome place, as the civilian casualties lay in heaps unburied and more than one slit trench was crowned with a grinning skull. The platoon there suffered casualties, including Corporal Steele, M.M.
One of our mortars which retaliated was knocked out and SecondLieutenant E. Burridge was killed. The gunners did a good piece of work in front of "B" Company,who had seen considerable numbers of the enemy going into some houses. Four rounds were fired and all were direct hits. There was no more activity in this area. Shell and mortar fire continued throughout the day but did little damage. Compulsory evacuation of civilians was ordered and, after considerable difficulty and some amusing incidents, was carried out. Later in the day, the Belgian troops also withdrew.
The l5th May found the Battalion still in position, the men by this time with their tails well up, having inflicted considerable casualties on the enemy with hardly any loss to themselves.
As the day wore on, shelling increased, both in Louvain itself and on the front of the lst Corps and the 7th Guards Brigade.
Signaller Donaldson was granted the immediate award of the Military Medal for continually going through the town under shell fire, for mending broken cables and for carrying on when blown off his bicycle. Signal cables were continually being cut and there were signs of tapping-in by Fifth Columnists. During the night a message was received from Brigade H.Q. that the enemy had broken through the R.U.R. and were in Louvain. Officers' patrols, backed up by the Carrier Platoon, were sent immediately to clear up the situation, but after a thorough search it was evident that the break-through was only an unfounded rumour. It was on this day that the Dutch Army laid down its arms, after an heroic but hopeless resistance of less than a week. Although this event had little actual effect upon the B.E.F. it naturally inflicted a further severe blow upon Belgian morale. Furthermore, the French Seventh Army had not only to withdraw its advanced troops to the immediate neighbourhood of Antwerp, but was also called upon to send several divisions to the support of the French Ninth Army in the south, where the German thrust through the Ardennes was already assuming grave proportions. This involved a movement across the rear and communications of the B.E.F., but was safely accomplished thanks to efficient traffic control.
Withdrawal to the River Dendre, 16th May.
Before the end of the first week's fighting, it had become obvious that the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that Plan "D" could not possibly be carried out farther. In the north, Holland was in German hands; in the south, the French Ninth Army appeared to be in danger of disintegrating, which meant that Arras and all the right flank were already threatened. A prolonged defence of the Dyle position was now out of the question. The 16th May found the 2nd Lincolnshires still in their positions at Louvain, but shelling increased during the day and one unlucky shell knocked out part of the carrier platoon harboured in the woods in Bn HQ.
At 4 p.m. the C.O. was called to Brigade H.Q. and given orders for the withdrawal to the River Dendre. The withdrawal was carried out without incident, except that the Officer Commanding "A" Company had to march in a wet shirt owing to the collapse of an improvised footbridge as he was crossing in rear of his company. This bridge was hastily constructed by the Pioneer Platoon over the River Dyle, to provide a quick and concealed line of withdrawal for the company. The Carrier Platoon blew the main bridge over the River Dyle and covered the withdrawal of the Battalion. The long march back of over thirty miles passed without any special incidents. All big packs, containing greatcoats, were dumped, but it may be recorded that the stretcher bearers transported a badly wounded man on a hand truck for the whole journey and got him safely to hospital at Brussels, where unfortunately he died. It was learnt afterwards that the Germans were so unaware of the withdrawal that they shelled Louvain for twelve hours after it had been evacuated.
The Battalion passed through a still sleeping Brussels at 3 a.m. on the 17th, the men weary but cheerful, and soon afterwards, passing through the 4th Division, reached a concentration area from which reconnaissance of the new positions was to be carried out. The Battalion took up good positions along the River Dendre, but these were later modified. "C" Company, under Major H.M.
Boxer, came under the command of the R.U.R., whilst the remainder of the Battalion went back to Brigade Reserve.
The German break-through in the south.
Meanwhile the position to the south was reported as being "obscure";
in fact, the rumoured "gap" had become a "corridor" and the enemy, in strength increasing to ten armoured divisions, had broken through some twenty miles south of the Foret de Mormal and their advanced guard of fast tanks and motor-cycles was pouring westwards across the Meuse and along the Somme, straight for Abbeville and the Channel coast. The British lines of communication.
which it will be remembered did not run straight back to Calais and Boulogne but south-westerly through Amiens to Cherbourg, Brest and St. Nazaire, were rapidly becoming endangered. There were in the rearward areas three British divisions, the 12th, 23rd and 46th, consisting of eight or nine battalions each, with divisional engineers but no artillery, with signals and administrative units in little more than skeleton form and deficient in armament and transport.
Despite these very serious handicaps, these divisions were called on at short notice to play their part in the Battle of France.
Lord Gort in his despatches says: "Troops of these three divisions fought and marched continuously for a fortnight and proved, if proof were needed, that they were composed of soldiers who, despite their inexperience and lack of equipment, could hold their own with a better found and more numerous enemy". And he spoke no more than the truth, as will be seen later.